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REFRAMING ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 
Richard Primus* 
 
[T]he true objective of the American Constitution was not to limit but to 
create more power. 
—Hannah Arendt, On Revolution1 
INTRODUCTION 
As a purely textual matter, the original Constitution’s2 enumeration of 
congressional powers could be read as a limiting list (“Congress may exercise 
these powers and no others”) or as a nonlimiting list (“Congress may exercise 
these powers and maybe also others”).  Either way, the cumulative scope of 
the powers that Congress may exercise could leave Congress with less 
legislative jurisdiction than it would have with a general police power, or it 
might turn out that the powers Congress enjoys are sufficient to authorize 
Congress to enact pretty much any legislation that it deems to be in the public 
interest3—subject, of course, to affirmative prohibitions like those in the Bill 
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 1. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 152 (1963). 
 2. By “the original Constitution,” I mean the 1787 text without amendments.  What I say 
in this sentence about two possible readings is true even after the addition of the 1791 
amendments, including the Tenth Amendment. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:  A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE 
FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 140–43 (New York, G. P. Putnam’s 
Sons 1890) (explaining how the text is consistent with the second possibility); Richard Primus, 
The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 629–34 (2014) (explaining how the text of the 
Tenth Amendment is consistent with the first and third possibilities above).  In this Essay, 
however, my argument is only about the unamended work product of the Convention. 
 3. These two possibilities can both be consistent with treating the powers of Congress as 
a limiting list because it is possible for a list of specific powers to be tantamount to a general 
power, as applied to the social world.  A legislature with seven enumerated powers has in 
essence a general legislative power if the seven enumerated powers are the power to legislate 
on Sunday, on Monday, and so forth. See Primus, supra note 2, at 576, 581, 593–94, 636–38. 
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of Rights.4  During the ratification debates, the Constitution’s leading 
proponents took the position that Congress is limited to its enumerated 
powers and that those powers, collectively, give Congress less authority than 
a grant of general jurisdiction would.5  Indeed, these proponents explained, 
the Convention had enumerated congressional powers in the Constitution 
precisely so as to keep Congress’s legislative jurisdiction limited.6  For the 
purpose of getting the Constitution ratified, taking that position was a prudent 
move.  But as many Americans recognized at the time, the claim that the 
enumeration of congressional powers was intended to limit the national 
government might have been disingenuous.7  The text easily supports other 
readings. 
The Constitution’s proponents won in 1787–88, and their representation 
that the Constitution created a government limited by its enumerated powers 
has long been orthodox.  That orthodoxy exists not only as a matter of law 
but also as a matter of narrative:  within our constitutional culture, the 
dominant story is that the Framers of the Constitution enumerated the powers 
of Congress in order to limit the federal government.8  But as a matter of 
history, that view has problems.  A better view, I suggest, would 
acknowledge that delegates at the Constitutional Convention might not have 
conceived9 the enumeration of powers as limiting—and certainly not as the 
kind of critical, limiting structure that it was later described as being.  Instead, 
the enumeration of powers might have been understood principally as a tool 
for empowering Congress.  In this short Essay, I seek to reframe the narrative 
of the Convention in those terms.10 
The reframed account of the Convention begins with the point that the 
Framers’ animating aim was the creation of a more powerful general 
government.  Not everyone at the Convention was equally enthusiastic about 
 
 4. I use the term “the Bill of Rights” here in its conventional modern sense—that is, as a 
shorthand reference to the first ten amendments. See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF 
THE CONSTITUTION:  HOW THE BILL OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS 6 (2018) 
(explaining that the term did not generally have that meaning in the founding era and giving 
an account of how the term came to be used that way later on). 
 5. See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in 
13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337, 339–40 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter DHRC]. 
 6. See, e.g., id. 
 7. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 14 
DHRC, supra note 5, at 482, 482–83. 
 8. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533–35 (2012). 
 9. The delegates at the Convention were many people thinking many things.  In this 
Essay, when I speak of views held by Convention delegates, I do not mean to say that all 
delegates held identical views.  The same is true when I speak of views held by the Framers 
of the Constitution—a phrase I use interchangeably with phrases like “the Convention 
delegates.” 
 10. It is not my view that either the meaning of the Constitution or the correct content of 
constitutional law is a unique or direct function of the ideas of the Convention delegates.  “The 
meaning of the Constitution” is an underspecified idea, and the determination of the correct 
content of constitutional law is pretty complex.  So, this Essay seeks a better understanding of 
the Convention but not on the theory that such an understanding would directly yield a better 
account of the legally authoritative meaning of the Constitution. 
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that project, but there was little doubt that that was the project, and many of 
the Framers were committed to strong forms of it.  The Framers understood 
that this more powerful government would need checks.11  But the checking 
mechanisms on which they rested most heavily had little to do with a system 
of enumerated powers.12  These mechanisms were the process limits built 
into the checks-and-balances system that the Convention spent most of the 
summer working out.13 
It is true, as people familiar with the Convention’s proceedings know, that 
the Virginia Plan’s proposal for a strong general government at the start of 
the Convention provoked a call to enumerate the powers of Congress, and it 
is also true that the motivation for that early call was to limit what Congress 
could do.14  But that call for enumerating congressional powers was probably 
motivated more by a desire to accomplish a specific thing—that is, to prevent 
Congress from interfering with slavery—than by a general theory about the 
allocation of power.15  What is more, that call for enumeration fizzled.  The 
textual enumeration of congressional powers that the Committee of Detail 
produced more than two months later and that eventually became Article I, 
Section 8 was not, or at least not principally, a response to that call from the 
Convention’s first days.  Nor was it, or at least not principally, a mechanism 
for limiting the national government.  Principally, it was a means for 
empowering that national government. 
My characterization of the enumeration of congressional powers as 
principally a means of empowerment, rather than limitation, is meant to 
convey that the enumeration of powers was neither all one thing nor all the 
other—neither only a means of limitation nor only a means of empowerment.  
Considered carefully, it had aspects of both.  But the fact that something has 
different aspects does not always mean that those different aspects are 
equally central, or equally weighty, within it.  My contention is that the 
Convention’s enumeration of congressional powers is best understood more 
in the register of empowerment than in that of limitation. 
The balance of this Essay proceeds as follows:  Part I identifies five 
significant problems with the conventional narrative about why the Framers 
enumerated the powers of Congress.  Part II describes Article I, Section 8 as 
a tool of empowerment, summarizing the reasons why empowering the 
general government was important and explaining why enumerating 
congressional powers would have been a good means toward that end.  Part 
III describes the Framers’ reasons for wanting to limit the general 
 
 11. See Primus, supra note 2, at 615–17. 
 12. See id. at 617–18. 
 13. See id. at 615–17. 
 14. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 53 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (May 31, 1787) (indicating that Pinckney and 
Rutledge, per Madison, asked for “an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended”).  It is 
possible, but less clear, that a statement by John Dickinson reacting to the Virginia Plan also 
suggested an enumeration of congressional powers. Id. at 42 (May 30, 1787) (statement of 
John Dickinson, per McHenry).  On the hazards of relying too much or too simply on the 
Convention’s surviving records, see infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
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government and asks whether an enumeration of congressional powers 
would have been a sensible tool for those purposes.  The moral of the 
reframed story, boiled down, is that the Convention’s enumeration of 
congressional powers makes more sense as primarily a means of empowering 
Congress than as primarily a means of limiting Congress—though of course, 
it had aspects of both.  Furthermore, to the extent that the enumeration was 
intended to place limits on Congress’s legislative jurisdiction, the point of 
articulating those limits was largely consistent with letting congressional 
jurisdiction grow over time if the general government’s practical capacities 
increased.16 
Three points about the limits of this Essay are here in order.  First, I do not 
attempt the painstaking reconstruction of fragmentary sources that would be 
required to produce a responsible narrative of the Convention, in a “here’s 
what happened” way.  I believe that a thorough narrative account would 
confirm my argument here, but producing that account would require an 
essay considerably longer than this one.  For now, my aim is only to reframe 
thinking about what the Convention did, not to paint a full picture within the 
frame.  But the framing is important, because our sense of the frame goes a 
long way toward determining which narratives we are willing to find 
persuasive when we try to make sense of a messy set of primary sources. 
Second, my subject here is the Convention, not the discourse of 
ratification, and I distrust ratification-era statements by the Constitution’s 
proponents as sources of information about the Convention.  During the 
ratification debates, the Constitution’s supporters had incentives to underplay 
the Constitution’s empowerment of the national government.  So I take 
ratification-era protestations by people like James Madison and James 
Wilson that the enumeration was designed to limit Congress with several 
grains of salt.  I seek an account of the enumeration that would have been 
available to a well-informed observer at the moment the Convention 
adjourned, not one overlaid with what people said later. 
Third, I do not claim that my reframed account, even if correct, would 
require any particular approach to legal doctrine, because I do not think that 
legal doctrine is or ought to be a direct consequence of ideas entertained or 
even agreed on at the Convention.  Depending on one’s theory of 
constitutional authority, one could accept my reframed account of the 
Convention but also think that, as a matter of law, courts should behave as if 
limiting Congress to a set of textually enumerated powers is an essential part 
of the constitutional system.  By the same token, one could reject my account 
but also think that courts should treat Congress as having something like 
general legislative jurisdiction, subject to affirmative prohibitions like those 
in the First Amendment.  I will say more about this aspect of the Essay in the 
conclusion. 
 
 16. This qualifier is the subject of Part III.D, which describes the relevance of the Framers’ 
view of the general government’s practical capacity for providing needed governance. 
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I.  FIVE PROBLEMS 
The standard narrative explaining the Constitutional Convention’s 
thinking on congressional powers goes something like this: 
The Framers were committed to creating a federal government that would 
pursue only a limited set of projects.17  At the start of the Convention, the 
Virginia delegation’s call for a national legislature with the power “to 
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent” was a 
placeholder to be used until a more specific set of powers could be crafted.18  
So when the Committee of Detail turned the Convention’s agreed-upon 
principles and compromises into a draft for a written constitution, it described 
Congress’s legislative jurisdiction with a list of specific powers.19  With a bit 
of tinkering, that list became Article I, Section 8.20  The delegates later 
emphasized the importance of having given Congress a closed list of specific 
powers when they overwhelmingly rejected proposals to include a Bill of 
Rights within the Constitution.21  Including a Bill of Rights would imply that 
Congress had the power to act except where it was affirmatively restrained.22  
The deliberate omission of a Bill of Rights, the standard narrative concludes, 
reflected the importance that the Convention attached to preserving the 
principle—central to the system’s design—that Congress could act only on 
the basis of its textually enumerated powers.23 
This narrative has problems.  Here are five. 
First, the documents that give us the best available view of the 
Convention’s proceedings suggest24 that key delegates believed Congress 
 
 17. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533–35 (2012). 
 18. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 177–78 (1996) (arguing that this was a plausible way for delegates to 
understand that portion of the Virginia Plan). 
 19. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 181–82 (Aug. 6, 1787). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 21. See Michael J. Klarman, The Founding Revisited, 125 HARV. L. REV. 544, 560 (2011) 
(reviewing PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
88 (2010)). 
 22. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
 23. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 535 (2012) (“Indeed, the 
Constitution did not initially include a Bill of Rights at least partly because the Framers felt 
the enumeration of powers sufficed to restrain the Government.”). 
 24. Writing about what happened inside the Convention is a task that should always be 
approached with caution.  There is no transcript of the proceedings.  There was an official 
journal, but it recorded the proceedings only sparingly, making note mostly of votes taken. 
See Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal Convention?, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620, 1623 (2012) (noting that the journal is a poor source of information 
regarding most of the questions that modern Americans want answered about the Convention).  
Most of the available evidence of what transpired is in the form of notes and diaries written 
by specific delegates, none of which is fully reliable and some of which were clearly doctored 
after the fact. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND:  REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 141 (2015) (describing the unreliability of the sources in general and of 
Madison’s notes in particular).  Even delegates recording the proceedings around them in good 
faith were surely liable of mischaracterizing the remarks of their fellow delegates a fair amount 
of the time, if only because people in large group conversations do not always thoroughly 
understand the complex thoughts that other people are trying to convey.  If you have ever 
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would have various powers whether or not those powers were specified in 
the text of the Constitution.  For example, according to Madison’s notes, John 
Rutledge believed that Congress would have the power to help states put 
down insurrections whether or not any clause of the Constitution so 
specified;25 Nathaniel Gorham believed that Congress would have the power 
to issue paper money without an express authorization;26 and James Wilson 
believed that Congress would be able to punish piracies, again even in the 
absence of an express authorization.27  This is not to say that nobody took 
the contrary view.  But Rutledge, Gorham, and Wilson were not marginal 
figures.  Indeed, they all sat on the committee that wrote the first draft of 
Congress’s powers.28  If Madison’s notes are reliable on these points,29 these 
three prominent delegates seem to have believed that there were powers that 
Congress would enjoy whether expressly specified or not.30 
Second, it is not true that the Framers omitted a Bill of Rights from their 
draft Constitution because they trusted the enumeration of congressional 
powers to limit the national government.  That story was invented after the 
fact, during the ratification process, in an attempt to respond to the contention 
that the Constitution’s lack of a Bill of Rights was a serious flaw.31  To 
defend the Constitution against that objection, some of the Constitution’s 
defenders hit on the idea of arguing that the absence of a Bill of Rights was 
a virtue, if only one understood the genius of what the Convention had 
done.32  The public did not buy this argument:  as often happens, the audience 
recognized an ex post rationalization for what it was, and the demand for a 
 
participated in a large committee meeting, or even a big family reunion, you will understand 
the problem.  It does not follow that we cannot responsibly make any assertions about what 
happened inside the Convention.  But claims about what happened should be made cautiously, 
constantly mindful that each source is only partially reliable.  One should not place too much 
significance on the precise words attributed to any delegate, because the accounts are not 
verbatim reporting; the words we read in the sources are the words of the diarists, not those of 
the speakers.  Perhaps most of all, one should be constantly vigilant against jumping too 
quickly to the conclusion that we have grasped what someone was trying to say. 
 25. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 48 (July 18, 1787) (per Madison). 
 26. See id. at 309 (Aug. 16, 1787) (per Madison). 
 27. See id. at 315 (Aug. 17, 1787) (per Madison). 
 28. See Primus, supra note 2, at 623 n.166. 
 29. As Mary Sarah Bilder has explained, Madison’s notes are especially unreliable for the 
portion of the Convention that occurred after August 21, 1787. See BILDER, supra note 24, at 
141.  The three pieces of evidence just described all come from his record of events before 
that date. 
 30. As a matter of practice, constitutional law seems to track this position—albeit 
sometimes unofficially, without express judicial acknowledgment—with respect to several 
congressional powers. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:  Indians, 
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (2002) (documenting areas of recognized but nonenumerated 
congressional power); Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 1389, 1396–1401 (2010) (illustrating the point with reference to immigration 
and foreign affairs powers). 
 31. See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting 
Rights:  The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 377–78 (2007). 
 32. Id. at 379. 
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Bill of Rights continued unabated.33  Today, of course, constitutional lawyers 
commonly accept the rationalization as if it were fact.  But that just means 
that the Constitution’s 1788 supporters managed to fool future generations 
on this point, despite failing to fool their contemporaries. 
The third problem is more subtle.  The standard account invites readers to 
imagine the drafters saying, “We’re going to make a list of congressional 
powers, on the understanding that Congress can only do the things on the 
list.”  Moreover, the standard account invites readers to imagine that the 
drafters then proceeded to write such a list—and that that list became Article 
I, Section 8.  But Article I, Section 8 is not a comprehensive list of the powers 
that the Convention allocated to Congress.  In the original Constitution, more 
than a third of the clauses granting power to Congress are outside of Article 
I, Section 8.34  The standard narrative imagines a list of powers implicitly 
headed, “These powers and no others,” when in fact the implicit heading of 
Section 8, from the Framers’ point of view, would have had to be something 
like, “These powers, among others.”  To be sure, one could have a system in 
which Congress may only exercise affirmatively enumerated powers even if 
those powers are scattered throughout the Constitution, rather than collected 
in a single list.  But the notion of a limiting enumeration is easiest to maintain 
if there exists, somewhere, a single list of the things that Congress is 
authorized to do.  The Framers wrote no such list.  And the fact that 
constitutional law commonly speaks as if Section 8 were a complete list of 
congressional powers35—even though it obviously is not—may suggest 
something about the profession’s impulse to present things as if they 
accorded with a tidy story about a limiting enumeration—even when they do 
not. 
Fourth, a problem arises about the mandate of the Convention’s 
Committee of Detail, which was the first drafting body to produce an 
enumeration of congressional powers and whose draft was accepted by the 
Convention with only minor emendations.36  That committee’s instructions 
included not just the original language of Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan, 
 
 33. Id. at 377–78. 
 34. Counting conservatively, the original Constitution had eleven such clauses outside of 
Section 8.  The Constitution as it exists today has twenty-five, again counting conservatively. 
 35. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 876 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Once a treaty has been made, Congress’s power to do what is ‘necessary and proper’ to 
assist the making of treaties drops out of the picture.  To legislate compliance with the United 
States’ treaty obligations, Congress must rely upon its independent (though quite robust) 
Article I, § 8 powers.”); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 135 (2010) (“Of course, as 
Chief Justice Marshall stated, a federal statute, in addition to being authorized by Art. I, § 8, 
must also ‘not [be] prohibited’ by the Constitution.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819))); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. 
Siegel, Collective Action Federalism:  A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 115 (2010); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1687, 1695 (2004) (“[O]ur first structural principle [is] that the courts do indeed possess 
authority to police the Article I, Section 8 powers.”). 
 36. For a wonderfully thorough and thoughtful account of the work of the Committee of 
Detail, see generally William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197 
(2012). 
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according to which Congress should be empowered “to legislate in all cases 
to which the separate States are incompetent”37 but an amended form of the 
resolution proposed by Delaware’s Gunning Bedford, according to which 
Congress would also have power “to legislate in all cases for the general 
interests of the Union.”38  That augmented formula, approved by a vote of 
eight states to two,39 does not seem to call for a constitution that limits 
Congress to a list of specific projects.  To be sure, it is the Constitution rather 
than the proceedings of the Convention that is the supreme law, so if the 
Constitution contradicts (the Bedford-modified) Resolution VI, it is the 
Constitution that prevails.  But to my knowledge, no scholar has produced a 
persuasive, evidence-based account establishing how and when (let alone 
why) the Convention decided to discard the instructions it gave the 
Committee of Detail and to accept a constitution characterized by a limiting 
enumeration, rather than one enabling Congress to legislate in the broad 
national-interest way that (the Bedford-modified) Resolution VI 
envisioned.40  The standard account of the limiting enumeration must say 
either that Resolution VI actually meant something less than it seems to or 
else that the Convention reversed itself—from an 8 to 2 vote, no less—
without leaving a record of when or why.  Perhaps some such explanation is 
correct:  the records of the Convention are incomplete, after all.  But it will 
not do to say things like, “Well, the fact that they wrote a limiting 
enumeration shows that they must have changed their minds.”  Whether the 
enumeration was written to be limiting is precisely the question at issue. 
Fifth and finally, a point about the relationship between intentions and 
results.  As every modern constitutional lawyer knows, the Constitution’s 
enumeration of congressional powers has not, in practice, prevented 
Congress from pursuing the projects for which it musters political will.  The 
Constitution shapes Congress’s ambitions through the structure of the 
lawmaking process—elections, bicameralism, presentment—and the courts 
have invalidated congressional legislation on the basis of affirmative 
prohibitions like those in the First Amendment,41 as well as on the basis of 
nontextual affirmative prohibitions conventionally associated with the Tenth 
Amendment (like the anti-commandeering rules).42  The courts have also 
invalidated congressional legislation on the grounds that such legislation 
violates the prerogatives of the other federal branches.43  But from the First 
Congress forward—albeit with an exceptional period around the turn of the 
twentieth century—courts have done precious little by way of using the 
 
 37. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 17 (July 16, 1787). 
 38. Id. at 21 (July 17, 1787). 
 39. Id. at 27. 
 40. For a good account of this problem and the ways in which various scholars have 
approached it, see Jonathan Gienapp, In Search of Nationhood at the Founding, 89 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1783, 1799–1801, 1799 n.110 (2021). 
 41. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 42. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 43. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 unconstitutional). 
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enumeration of congressional powers to limit the scope of national 
policymaking.44  This fact does not prove that the Framers did not intend the 
enumeration as meaningfully limiting.  But if they did so intend, then it must 
be accepted that the Framers were, in this crucial respect, quite bad at 
constitutional design because a central part of the machinery seems to have 
utterly failed, more or less from the inception.  Nor can the Framers be 
rescued from this charge by saying that their design was good but that the 
Constitution has been systematically misapplied by judges and other officials 
from 1789 forward; the correct anticipation of how real people in office will 
act is a necessary part of successful constitutional design. 
None of these problems necessarily falsifies the standard account.  One 
could produce plausible arguments explaining each problem away, especially 
if the problems are taken one by one.  But sometimes the accumulation of 
problems within a narrative is a sign that something about that narrative 
really is wrong, just as an accumulation of epicycles can signal the need to 
revise an underlying theory.  In the present case, it is possible to revise the 
dominant understanding of the Convention in a way that leaves readers with 
fewer and less serious problems.  And the first step toward a better account 
is the recognition that the Convention’s animating purpose was the creation 
of a powerful general government. 
II.  ENUMERATION AS EMPOWERMENT 
A.  The Need to Empower 
Bad Governts.  are of two sorts.  I. that which does too little.  2. that which 
does too much:  that which fails thro’ weakness; and that which destroys 
thro’ oppression.  Under which of these evils do the U. States at present 
groan?  under the weakness and inefficiency of its Governt.  To remedy this 
weakness we have been sent to this Convention. 
—James Wilson45 
 
 44. It is possible that the striking absence of court cases holding federal statutes to exceed 
the enumerated powers of Congress does not mean that the enumeration of powers has not in 
fact limited Congress, because it is possible that the enumeration of powers has limited 
Congress’s own conception of what it should do.  It is certainly the case that the idea that the 
enumeration is limiting has sometimes been marshaled within Congress as an argument 
against legislation, and it is possible that the marshaling of that argument had some tendency 
to prevent Congress from passing legislation that otherwise would have been passed.  Between 
the Andrew Jackson administration and the Civil War, the idea of a Congress limited by its 
enumerated powers was an important piece of the constitutional ideology holding the 
Democratic Party together, so it is plausible that that idea had some influence on what 
Congress did. See Richard Primus & Roderick M. Hills Jr., Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated 
Powers:  A Guide for Leaving the Lamppost, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).  But it 
is hard to know for sure.  After all, it is also possible that most arguments about enumerated 
powers in Congress have been makeweights, or reflections of substantive opposition to the 
relevant legislation, and that there just was not majority support in Congress for the legislation, 
such that arguments about constitutional limits were not changing outcomes. 
 45. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 483–84 (June 30, 1787) (statement of James 
Wilson as recorded by Madison ). 
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The Articles of Confederation provided for a unicameral Congress.46  That 
Congress—or the “general government,” as Americans often called Congress 
and the small collection of officials it directed47—was a weak institution.  By 
1787, it was clear to many Americans that the general government’s 
weakness was a serious problem.48 
For starters, Congress had trouble raising money, including the money it 
needed to pay debts incurred during the Revolutionary War.49  Congress had 
no power to impose taxes.50  Instead, it was supposed to make requisitions of 
the states, meaning that Congress could identify an amount of money that 
each state was supposed to raise and contribute to the federal treasury.51  But 
Congress had no power to compel payment, and the states never paid their 
requisitions in full, if they paid them at all.52  As a result, the United States 
could not repay loans that it owed to foreign countries, and that made the new 
nation’s international standing somewhat dicey.53  Nor could Congress 
reliably pay its own employees, including the members of the small U.S. 
Army.54  Organizing his thoughts in advance of the Convention, Madison 
described this problem as both fatal to and inherent in the existing structure 
of American government.  It resulted, he wrote, “naturally from the number 
and independent authority of the States.”55 
The failure of the states to act as a union created many problems in foreign 
affairs.  When Britain imposed trade restrictions on American ships, 
Congress could not order a unified American response.56  The same was true 
when Spain closed the Mississippi River to American shipping and when 
pirates seized American ships in the Mediterranean Sea.57  Moreover, several 
states took actions that violated the Treaty of Paris, which had ended the 
Revolutionary War.58  For example, the treaty provided that Americans who 
had remained loyal to Britain during the war would not be treated as criminals 
and that their remaining property would not be expropriated.59  But states 
violated those guarantees, and Congress could do nothing to make the states 
comply.60  Given American noncompliance, Britain often refused to adhere 
 
 46. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V. 
 47. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 7, at 482–83; see 
also 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 284 (June 18, 1787) (statement of Alexander 
Hamilton, as rendered by Madison); id. at 357 (June 21, 1787) (statement of James Madison, 
as rendered by Madison). 
 48. See MAIER, supra note 21, at 11–17. 
 49. See id. at 11. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 11–12. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at 12–13. 
 55. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, reprinted in 2 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1783–1787, at 361, 361 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). 
 56. See MAIER, supra note 21, at 12. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 13. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
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to its obligations under the treaty, including its obligation to complete the 
withdrawal of its forces from North America.61  So, even after the war was 
over, British garrisons remained within the borders of some American 
states.62  Congress could do nothing about it. 
Domestic affairs were difficult as well.  Many states pursued protectionist 
economic policies, essentially treating other states like foreign countries for 
economic purposes.63  One state’s actions to the detriment of another state 
naturally produced retaliatory measures with results that were bad for most 
people involved.  In some places, economic hardship led to violence, 
including most famously in western Massachusetts in an uprising known as 
Shays’s Rebellion.64  And Congress could do little or nothing to bring 
economic stability or cooperation to the states.  It had relatively little power, 
and the power it had was regularly flouted. 
Moreover, the domestic governance problems in the United States were 
not simply a matter of weakness at the center.  The state governments were 
themselves often ineffective, even within their own boundaries.65  Shays’s 
Rebellion is again emblematic:  the problem was not merely the adverse 
economic conditions that motivated the rebellion but also the weakness of 
the state government, which could barely maintain its own authority against 
the rebels.66  Constitutional law’s standard telling of the transition from the 
Articles of Confederation to the Constitution underplays this problem 
because it depicts the system under the Articles as one of “sovereign” states, 
and sovereign states are usually imagined as capable of internal governance.  
But in the 1780s, the United States was not a place neatly carved up among 
what modern social scientists would recognize as Weberian states—that is, 
governments enjoying monopolies on legitimate violence within 
geographically defined territories.67  For one thing, many of the states lacked 
clear geographic boundaries:  a fair amount of territory was claimed by more 
than one state at a time.68  Perhaps more to the point, the state governments 
often exercised their authority, not as the exclusively legitimate powers from 
which all other legitimate political authority must flow within the territories 
they claimed but as important actors within a complex ecosystem of other 
 
 61. See id. at 396. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. at 14. 
 64. See id. at 15–17.  See generally SHAYS’ REBELLION:  SELECTED ESSAYS (Martin 
Kaufman ed., 1987). 
 65. See MAIER, supra note 21, at 16. 
 66. See id. at 15–16. 
 67. See Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States:  The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE 
L.J. 1792, 1804–08 (2019); see also Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER:  
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946) (defining the state 
as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory”).  For an important exploration of the possibility that 
the Weberian model is inapposite for the analysis of American states even long after the 
founding period, see William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. 
HIST. REV. 752, 761–71 (2008). 
 68. See Craig Green, United/States:  A Revolutionary History of American Statehood, 119 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 35–40 (2020). 
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power-wielding institutions:  corporations, towns, churches, Native Nations, 
separatist movements, and so on.69  Shays’s Rebellion was a particularly 
prominent episode in which the authority of a state to govern within its 
claimed territory was called into serious question, but it was by no means the 
only one.70 
In that light, as Professor Gregory Ablavsky has explained, the standard 
story on which the adoption of the Constitution relocated sovereignty from 
the state governments to the United States obscures a messier reality.71  In 
practice, the pre-1789 state governments could not easily exercise the kind 
of power that sovereignty usually implies—power to which every other actor 
must yield.72  And contrary to the normal zero-sum presentation, the creation 
of a stronger national government was an opportunity for the state 
governments to become more powerful in practice.  After all, the Constitution 
did not merely create a stronger general government.  It created a system in 
which the only players other than that general government were the state 
governments.  With a more robust general government at their backs, the 
state governments could clear the field of local claimants (towns, counties, 
corporations) to autonomy or quasi-sovereign power.73  And the 
Constitution’s promoters clearly understood that their plan offered this 
benefit to the state governments.  Hamilton’s Federalist No. 9, for example, 
is an advertisement for the Union’s ability to marshal overwhelming force to 
crush insurrections against the various state governments.74 
This understanding of the condition of the state governments in 1787 
provides important context for reconstructing the Framers’ senses of the 
relationship between a stronger general government and effective local 
government.  If the state governments are imagined as firmly rooted and fully 
functional local sovereigns under the Articles, then it is natural to think that 
serious people in 1787 would have wanted to adjust the power of the general 
government only slightly—enough to improve coordination among the states 
but not enough to do much more than that.75  But if the state governments are 
imagined as a bit more rickety, the field of possibilities looks different.  In 
particular, it is then easier to understand why serious people would have been 
keen to vest extensive power in a national government—and perhaps to 
worry more about empowering the national government too little than about 
 
 69. See Ablavsky, supra note 67, at 1795–96. 
 70. See id. at 1810–11, 1815. 
 71. See id. at 1796. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 22 (Alexander Hamilton).  Read next to its 
neighbor, Madison’s argument in Federalist No. 10 that the extended republic will “break and 
control the violence of faction,” looks like a bloodless sequel—the same argument, but with 
less at stake. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 22 (James Madison).  After all, the 
“violence” to be broken and controlled in Federalist No. 10 is largely metaphorical. See id. 
 75. One important strain of scholarship has depicted the Convention’s aim as the creation 
of a general government empowered to solve collective action problems among the states. See 
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 35, at 115.  The present analysis suggests that solving collective 
action problems was only part of why a more powerful general government was needed. 
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empowering it too much.  That, of course, is the attitude on display in the 
comment by Wilson76 that opens this section of this Essay. 
For all these reasons, the delegates who went to the Philadelphia 
Convention in 1787 went to create a more powerful central government.  
They were not all of one mind about how that new government should 
function.  There were fifty-five of them, after all.  But the common problem 
that they faced was a deficit of government power, and their disagreements 
would concern the best ways to make their general government more 
powerful. 
B.  The Utility of Enumerating Powers 
To understand the utility of enumerating congressional powers as a means 
of making the general government sufficiently powerful, it is useful to keep 
in mind two facts that confronted the Framers.  First, their envisioned 
government would function in a world where not everyone would be happy 
about the general government’s exercising consequential powers.  Objections 
might be rooted in general opposition to national governance, in displeasure 
with specific measures taken, or both.  But for one reason or another, the new 
government’s actions were sure to be frequently opposed, and the question 
of its power to take action would be frequently contested.  People would 
argue about whether the government could do this or that thing.  When that 
happened, a constitution that described congressional power only in general 
terms would not be much help.77  Imagine, for example, a constitution 
declaring, in the words of Resolution VI, that Congress had the power “to 
legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those 
to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of 
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
legislation.”78  Objectors to congressional legislation would then predictably 
argue that this or that matter did not touch the general interests of the Union 
and was not beyond the competence of the states separately and raised no 
issue related to the harmony of the United States.  If the decisionmakers 
turned out to be skeptics about central power—and keep in mind that many 
decisions might be made in state courts—then those arguments would often 
be accepted, thus defeating the major purpose of holding the Philadelphia 
Convention in the first place.79  On the other hand, if the Constitution spoke 
more specifically about which powers Congress was entitled to exercise—
say, the power to tax, to regulate commerce, or to make bankruptcy laws—
 
 76. As rendered by Madison, anyway. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 339. 
 77. Assuming, of course, that the general principle was not something like “Congress may 
legislate however it likes.” 
 78. This is the language of Resolution VI as amended on July 17, 1787, on the motion of 
Gunning Bedford. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 21 (July 17, 1787).  It was in this 
form that Resolution VI was given as an instruction to the Committee of Detail when that 
Committee set about writing the first actual draft of the Constitution. 
 79. A generally stated formula for broad congressional power could get the job done if all 
the decisionmakers were reliable Federalists.  But they would not be, and the Convention 
delegates knew that. 
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then defenders of congressional action could more easily establish their 
position by pointing to specific authorizations in the constitutional text.80  If 
a government actor wants a skeptic to accept his authority to take a certain 
action, it is helpful not just to have the authority in writing but also for the 
written statement of his authority to state his relevant power in specific 
language.81 
A second background fact raised the premium on putting specific 
congressional authorities in writing.82  The Articles of Confederation 
enumerated a set of congressional powers.83  Those powers included the 
power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, to regulate trade 
with Indian tribes, to coin money and regulate its value, to fix standards for 
weights and measures, to establish post offices, to declare war, to grant letters 
of marque and reprisal, to make rules concerning captures on land and on 
water, to provide for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high 
seas, to build and equip a navy, and to make rules for the government and 
regulation of the land and naval forces.84  The Framers repeated those 
specific authorizations in Article I, Section 8, and it is not hard to see why.  
Omitting specific mention of a power specified in the Articles would risk the 
inference that a power conferred by the Articles was not conferred by the 
Constitution.85 
Moreover, even if future interpreters of the Constitution correctly 
concluded that some powers not specified in the constitutional text were 
 
 80. I say “more easily” rather than “reliably” because people can also argue about what 
constitutes a tax, or a regulation of commerce, or a bankruptcy law.  But over a broad domain 
of actions Congress might take, the more specific authorizations set the boundaries of 
reasonable argument in a more Congress-friendly location. 
 81. Consider in this connection the strategy adopted by the drafters of the Canadian 
Constitution, who worked eighty years after the Philadelphia Convention and who could draw 
on the lessons of the American experience.  In Canada’s Constitution, the text setting forth the 
legislative authority of Parliament—Section 91—contains a general statement of power “to 
make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada.” Constitution Act, 1867, 
30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 91 (U.K.).  That clause—the “POGG Clause”—is followed by an 
enumerated list of specific matters to which Parliament’s legislative authority extends. Id.  
And Section 91 expressly explains that the enumerated list follows “for greater Certainty, but 
not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section” (i.e., the POGG 
Clause). Id.  In other words, the list of specific powers is provided to make certain that the 
particular subjects identified there—public debt, the regulation of trade and commerce, raising 
money by taxation, and so forth—fall within the broad grant of the POGG Clause, rather than 
taking the risk that subsequent decisionmakers might construe “Peace, Order, and good 
Government” narrowly enough to exclude the enumerated subjects. See id. 
 82. An earlier version of the point made in these two paragraphs appears in 1 WILLIAM 
WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
410–28, 465–67 (1953). 
 83. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Later readers of the Constitution understood this point, arguing for the significance of 
the absence in the Constitution of something that appeared in the Articles. See, e.g., Centinel 
II, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 5, at 457, 460 
(noting that the Articles of Confederation expressly specified the principle that each state 
retained all powers not expressly delegated to the United States); see also McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (noting that the Constitution, unlike the 
Articles, did not affirmatively exclude incidental powers). 
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meant to be vested in the national government, they might then divide on the 
question of where in the national government those powers were lodged.  
Under the Articles, all powers vested in the United States were held by a 
single institution:  the United States in Congress assembled.86  But under the 
Constitution, “Congress” became just one of three branches of government—
and it could not automatically be assumed that the powers held by the United 
States in Congress assembled under the Articles would be powers of 
Congress in the new three-branch system.  Some of the powers that the 
Articles had given to the United States in Congress assembled—like the 
power to send and receive ambassadors and the power to direct military 
operations87—would under the Constitution be allocated to the president.88  
To omit express instructions about who in the new government could 
exercise which powers mentioned in the Articles would therefore beg some 
obvious questions.89  Worse still, several of the powers that the Framers 
wanted to assign to Congress were powers associated with the king, rather 
than Parliament, in Blackstone’s description of the British Constitution.90  So 
it was more than foreseeable that in the absence of a contrary instruction, 
people would argue that those powers were naturally vested in the president 
rather than in Congress.  If the Framers wanted Congress to wield those 
powers, they needed to say so explicitly. 
Nothing about these rationales for expressly enumerating many powers of 
Congress required that all of the powers of Congress be enumerated.  The 
point of the enumeration, understood this way, was not to rule out powers not 
mentioned.  It was to rule in a bunch of powers that were important to specify, 
lest Congress’s authority to exercise those powers be doubted.91  And within 
 
 86. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II. 
 87. See id. art. IX. 
 88. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (power to appoint ambassadors); id. § 3 (power to 
receive ambassadors); id. § 2, cl. 1 (power to act as commander in chief of military forces). 
 89. This separation of powers problem also explains why the Convention could not solve 
the first problem—that is, of negating the inference that a power specified in the Articles was 
also vested in the general government under the Constitution—with a blanket statement like:  
“All power vested in the United States under the Articles continues to be vested in the United 
States under the Constitution.”  Such a statement would not address the crucial question of 
who, under the Constitution, could exercise that power on behalf of the United States. 
 90. Blackstone’s list of Crown powers included the powers to regulate commerce, 
naturalize aliens, coin money, regulate weights and measures, establish courts, declare war, 
issue letters of marque and reprisal, and raise and regulate armies and navies. See 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *244–68.  This fact suggests a reason why the Convention 
could not solve the problem of allocating powers specified in the Articles among the branches 
of the new government by writing something like:  “All legislative powers vested in the United 
States under the Confederation shall be vested in Congress, and all executive powers vested 
in the United States under the Confederation shall be vested in a President.”  In a world where 
several powers the Framers wanted to allocate to Congress were prominently identified as 
Crown powers, invoking the categories “legislative” and “executive” might not be a reliable 
way of producing the specific allocation they wanted. 
 91. Just like Section 91 of the Canadian Constitution. See supra note 81.  The fact that the 
Canadian Constitution makes this clear (by using the POGG Clause as well as an enumeration 
of powers) while the U.S. Constitution does not might reflect a difference in how the 
constitutions were supposed to function, but it might also reflect the Canadians’ having 
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a system where Congress was understood to possess many powers, including 
but not limited to, those expressly specified, the considerations just discussed 
would supply good reasons for enumerating a list of powers that looks a lot 
like Article I, Section 8. 
III.  ENUMERATION AS LIMITATION 
The Framers wanted to limit the general government as well as empower 
it.  But given their reasons for limiting the general government and given 
what enumerations of powers are and are not good for, it is not clear why 
they would have chosen an enumeration of powers as a device for doing the 
limiting work. 
To begin to see why not, it is important to recognize that something known 
now about enumerating legislative powers was not entirely unknown to the 
Framers.  Constitutional lawyers today generally recognize that the 
enumeration of Congress’s powers does not much constrain Congress in 
practice.  With the exception of a period early in the twentieth century,92 
Congress has been able to do pretty much anything for which it has mustered 
political will,93 and the courts have construed Congress’s powers as 
sufficient to warrant whatever it is that Congress decided needed to be done.  
The anomalous judicial resistance of the early twentieth century came to a 
crashing and inglorious end.94  Committed believers in enumerationism 
might protest that this pattern reveals not something inherent in the system 
of enumerated powers but simply the poor performance of American 
officials—especially judges—who have failed to implement the system 
properly.95  It is hard to falsify such a claim directly, but when an argument 
relies on the premise that an entire professional class has done its job badly 
for a very long time, it is worth considering whether what is lacking is the 
behavior of all those people or the idea that they are supposed to be doing 
something else.  In any event, a feature of a constitutional system is only as 
good as it is in practice.  Put differently:  if the Framers wanted to impose 
serious limits on federal legislation, and they had known what every modern 
constitutional lawyer knows about whether the enumeration has limited 
Congress in practice, it is hard to imagine that the Framers would have put 
their eggs in that basket. 
 
learned, by observing American constitutional discourse, that in the absence of something like 
a POGG Clause the function of an enumeration of powers might be misunderstood. 
 92. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251 (1918). 
 93. Again, it is possible that the idea of a limiting enumeration has done limiting work 
within Congress or at least that it did so during an important stretch of the nineteenth century. 
See supra note 44.  But even that possibility is speculative.  And in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, it seems hard to identify projects that Congress would have liked to pursue but 
abstained from pursuing due to the limits of Congress’s enumerated powers. 
 94. See generally JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER:  FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME 
COURT (2010). 
 95. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 1 (2013) (“Had judges done their job, this book would not need to 
be written.”). 
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To be sure, we now know things about how the system has operated that 
the Framers could not know.  But their ignorance should not be 
overestimated.  Some of them knew already in the 1780s that enumerating 
the powers of a legislature was not a reliable way to impose ex ante limits on 
what that legislature will do in practice.  Madison knew it, and he said so.96  
The better ways to limit a legislature, in his view, were with affirmative 
prohibitions (like the ones in Article I, Section 9) and with what modern 
theorists call “process limits” (like bicameralism, executive presentment, and 
the requirement that legislators stand frequently for election).97  There is no 
reason to think that Madison was unique in holding these views.  Other 
leading Framers also expressed doubts about the practicability of dividing 
national and local spheres of action by enumerating the powers of 
Congress.98  And to the extent that one can infer what the Convention thought 
of as the most important parts of its work by looking at how much time and 
discussion was spent on particular subjects, it certainly seems that the 
Framers regarded process limits as considerably more important than the 
enumeration of congressional powers. 
This is not to say that nobody at the Convention thought of enumerating 
Congress’s powers as a mechanism capable of imposing meaningful limits 
on that institution.  The Framers were many people thinking many things.  
But in asking whether it makes sense to think that the Convention generally 
saw enumeration as a means of limitation—or, perhaps more precisely, to 
think about the relative proportions in which its members thought of it as a 
means of limitation rather than a means of empowerment—it is important to 
avoid imagining the Framers as less sophisticated about real-world 
governance than they actually were.  If enumerating powers is not a 
particularly effective way to limit a legislature and if eighteenth-century 
Americans recognized that fact, then we should be open to thinking that 
although the Framers wanted to put limits on Congress, they might not have 
relied on enumerating congressional powers to do the job.  Certainly many 
of the Constitution’s opponents said outright that the enumeration of powers 
would not limit Congress,99 and they have turned out to be right.  Maybe the 
Framers were as discerning as their opponents. 
 
 96. See Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 2 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON 1783–1787, supra note 55, at 166, 168. 
 97. Id. at 167–69. 
 98. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 59–60 (May 31, 1787) (statement 
of Roger Sherman, as rendered by Pierce); id. at 172 (June 8, 1787) (statement of John 
Dickerson, as rendered by King) (“There can be no line of separation dividing the powers of 
legislation between the State & Genl. Govts.”). 
 99. Including some who attended the Convention. See SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 251 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) 
(statement of Mason characterizing the draft Constitution as having given indefinite power to 
the national government); Brutus XII, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 
5, at 72, 74 (pseudonymous letter of New York delegate Robert Yates) (writing that under the 
Constitution, the general government’s power would “extend to every case for which any 
government is instituted”).  Randolph was not exactly an opponent—he supported the 
Constitution during ratification, though he refused to sign the draft at Philadelphia—but he 
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With that point as background, I now turn to four leading reasons why 
delegates at the Convention might have wanted to limit Congress, and I ask 
about the suitability of enumeration as a tool for each. 
A.  Liberty 
Many Americans in the 1780s wanted to limit the general government 
because they feared that republican liberty could not survive in a polity as 
large as the United States.100  The central concern, boiled down, was that the 
country was too vast and the population too large for the people and the 
government officials who supposedly represented them to know and trust 
each other.101  The people would thus (correctly) come to perceive the 
government as alien rather than representative, and the government’s 
authority would need to rely more and more on force rather than goodwill.102  
Down that road lay tyranny.  George Washington’s one recorded substantive 
intervention in the Convention’s proceedings may have been intended to 
address just this threat.  According to multiple accounts, Washington, shortly 
before the Convention adjourned, spoke in favor of increasing the permitted 
number of representatives in Congress for each state from one for every 
40,000 residents to one for every 30,000.103  More representatives per capita 
would reduce the threat that the people and the government would become 
alien to one another.104  The Convention accepted the change.105 
 
saw the same thing. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 488–89 (Sept. 3, 1787) 
(statement of Edmund Randolph, as rendered by Madison). 
 100. See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE:  NEW YORK AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 221 
(2005). 
 101. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Pendleton (May 26, 1788), in 9 
DHRC, supra note 5, at 878, 879; Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Apr. 28, 
1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 5, at 765, 765. 
 102. See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 100, at 221. 
 103. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 643–44 (Sept. 17, 1787) (as recorded in 
Madison’s notes); 3 id. at 337 (June 24, 1788) (as described by Hamilton at the New York 
ratifying convention); see also id. at 358 (Aug. 14, 1789) (as recollected by Roger Sherman, 
speaking in the House of Representatives). 
 104. Not everyone described the change from 40,000 to 30,000 as motivated by this benign 
purpose. See Luther Martin, Att’y Gen. of Md., Genuine Information (Nov. 29, 1787), 
reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 172, 199–200 (describing the change as 
motivated by a desire to increase the power of large states, whose populations could be 
expected to grow more quickly). 
 105. The degree of enthusiasm with which the Convention accepted the change is a matter 
of dispute in the surviving records.  According to Madison’s notes, the motion was agreed to 
unanimously. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 644 (Sept. 17, 1787).  That portion 
of Madison’s notes was written at least two years after the Convention rose, rather than 
contemporaneously. See BILDER, supra note 24, at 141.  According to the Annals of Congress, 
however, Roger Sherman in 1789 said that “not more than nine States” had voted in favor of 
the change. See 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 358.  The gap between presenting 
the change as unanimous and presenting it as contested might reflect a difference in attitude 
as to whether the measure was motivated by impartial motives.  Madison, who described the 
change as unanimous, wrote that the motion had been introduced by Gorham “for the purpose 
of lessening objections to the Constitution.” See 2 id. at 643 (Sept. 17, 1787).  Sherman, who 
described the change as contested, represented a state that, on Martin’s somewhat darker 
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The fear of an unrepresentative government could certainly motivate 
people to want that government’s powers to be limited—even severely 
limited.  But it does not follow that the Convention’s enumeration of 
congressional powers was substantially motivated by this concern.  It is hard 
to identify people who worried that the general government created by the 
Constitution would be sufficiently nonrepresentative as to risk devolution 
into tyranny but who also thought that the Constitution’s enumeration of 
powers was anything like a satisfactory solution.  The powers that Congress 
was affirmatively given, including the powers to tax and to raise armies, were 
sufficient tools of oppression in the hands of a government inclined to wield 
them that way.106 
The sensible solution to the problem that a remote and unrepresentative 
government would become tyrannical over time would not have been to limit 
that government to a specific set of powers, including those powers most 
valuable to a tyrannical oppressor.  It would have been either to make the 
government more representative or to take other steps to prevent the 
government from exercising its potentially tyrannical powers abusively.  
Washington’s intervention about the number of representatives per capita 
was a form of the first strategy107:  it aimed to bolster confidence that a 
national government could be adequately representative, not to mitigate the 
threat posed by a nonrepresentative government by limiting its powers.  The 
work that occupied most of the Convention’s attention—that of structuring a 
system of checks and balances—embodied the second strategy.108 
B.  Slavery 
For many Americans, the abstract concern with protecting republican 
liberty coexisted—uneasily or otherwise—with a concrete imperative to 
perpetuate chattel slavery.109  Slaveholders in states where slavery was strong 
wanted to be certain that a powerful national government would not become 
a vehicle for emancipation.  At the Convention, the most prominent early 
calls to enumerate Congress’s powers came from Charles Pinckney, John 
Rutledge, and Pierce Butler—all from South Carolina.110  These men were 
 
interpretation of the change, would stand to be disadvantaged relative to the large states if the 
change were adopted. See infra note 109. 
 106. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 101, at 
879–80 (expressing the concern that the country would be too large for government to be 
representative and identifying the enumerated congressional power to tax as sufficient to 
render “resistance vain”); George Mason, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 
14, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 410, 416 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, Jonathan Elliot 2d ed. 
1836). 
 107. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Primus, supra note 2, at 616. 
 109. At least some Convention delegates were aware of the tension. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 14, at 364 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of Luther Martin, as rendered by 
Madison) (describing a constitutional provision protecting the importation of slaves as 
“inconsistent with the principles of the revolution and dishonorable to the American 
character”). 
 110. 1 id. at 53 (May 31, 1787) (as recorded by Madison). 
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not, as a general matter, skeptical of centralizing power.111  Over the course 
of the Convention, all would play important roles in pushing for a vigorous 
general government.  But South Carolina had a keen interest in ensuring that 
one particular subject matter—or to use a local term, one domestic 
institution—would remain under South Carolina’s control rather than being 
subjected to the authority of the United States in general.112  Pinckney’s 
cousin and fellow South Carolina delegate Charles Cotesworth Pinckney told 
the Convention bluntly that South Carolina would support no Constitution 
that did not give Southern states protection against emancipation.113  So 
when these generally pro-national-power delegates said it was important to 
enumerate Congress’s powers, they might have had a particular aim in mind. 
The South Carolinians’ early call for enumerating congressional powers 
was an immediate response to the Virginia Plan’s Resolution VI, which 
recommended a congress able to legislate “in all cases to which the State 
Legislatures were individually incompetent.”114  It is not hard to imagine 
delegates primed to spot threats to slavery seeing danger in that general 
language and responding with a call for greater specificity.  But if so, the 
South Carolinians may have quickly realized that enumerating Congress’s 
powers was not the best strategy for vindicating their interest.  After a 
conversation in which several delegates expressed skepticism about the 
practicability of separating national and local spheres of authority by 
enumerating congressional powers,115 the South Carolina delegates backed 
off of their request for greater specificity and joined all the other states but 
Connecticut in approving Resolution VI.116 
That did not mean, of course, that South Carolina’s delegates had 
moderated their commitment to protecting slavery.  But perhaps they realized 
that different strategies made more sense.  One of those better strategies 
looked to affirmative prohibitions, and the other looked to voting power 
within the political process. 
With respect to affirmative prohibitions, as the Convention progressed, 
South Carolina’s delegates insisted on two affirmative prohibitions on 
congressional power:  one prohibiting Congress from preventing the 
 
 111. See id. at 144 (June 6, 1787) (statement of Pierce Butler, per King) (articulating 
openness to abolishing the state legislatures and creating a single consolidated national 
government); id. at 162 (June 8, 1787) (per Convention Journal) (discussing Charles 
Pinckney’s motion to give Congress the power to veto all state laws “which to them shall 
appear improper”); 2 id. at 48 (July 18, 1787) (statement of John Rutledge, per Madison) 
(articulating that Congress would have the power to suppress insurrections in the states even 
if no such power were expressly specified). 
 112. See 2 id. at 95 (July 23, 1787). 
 113. See id. 
 114. 1 id. at 53 (May 31, 1787) (as recorded by Madison). 
 115. See id. (statement of James Madison, as recorded by Madison); id. at 59–60 
(statements of Roger Sherman, James Wilson, and James Madison, as recorded by Pierce). 
 116. See id. at 53–54 (as recorded by Madison); see also id. at 47 (as recorded in 
Convention Journal).  Seven weeks later, when the Convention adopted a strengthened form 
of Resolution VI on which Congress would also have power “to legislate in all cases for the 
general interests of the Union,” South Carolina and Georgia cast the only votes in opposition. 
See 2 id. at 21, 24 (July 17, 1787) (per Convention Journal). 
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importation of slaves and one banning the taxation of exports.117  The 
relevance of the first prohibition is obvious and that of the second only a bit 
less so.  As the delegates understood, the general government could endanger 
slavery either by legislating against it directly or, if prohibited from doing 
that, by taxing the export of the Southern states’ slave-produced agricultural 
products to the point of unprofitability.118  This strategy of protecting an 
important local interest with affirmative prohibitions on Congress, rather 
than by omitting relevant powers from Congress’s arsenal, was eminently 
logical.  If one’s goal is to protect a particular activity from national power, 
it makes considerably more sense to create an immunity for that activity than 
to pursue the indirect strategy of giving Congress twenty or thirty powers and 
calculating that none of them can be deployed to interfere with that activity.  
(Especially if the powers given to Congress include, say, the powers to tax 
and to regulate commerce.)  Consider:  despite the claims of some leading 
Federalists, the public knew better than to believe that the enumeration of 
congressional powers made the freedoms of speech and press secure.119  
Affirmative prohibitions were a more logical means to that end.  The South 
Carolina delegates surely knew the same thing about slavery.120 
And with respect to voting power within the political process, the Three-
Fifths Clause121 and the Electoral College would enhance Southern power in 
the general government, thus preventing that government from exercising its 
powers in ways hostile to slavery.  Indeed, there are some indications that 
Southern delegates expected this arrangement to protect their interests even 
more powerfully in the long term than in the short term, because they 
expected new western states to align mostly with the South.122  On that 
assumption, South Carolina could agree in 1787 to constitutional protection 
 
 117. See 2 id. at 306 (Aug. 16, 1787) (statement of John Rutledge, as rendered by Madison); 
id. at 364–65 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of Charles Pinckney, as rendered by Madison).  
Delegates with other ideas forced a compromise on the latter prohibition under which 
Congress could prohibit the slave trade in or after the year 1808. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, 
cl. 1. 
 118. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 360 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of Oliver 
Ellsworth, as rendered by Madison) (explaining that the debate over taxing exports was really 
only about a small number of taxable exportable commodities, namely tobacco, rice, and 
indigo); id. (reporting that “Mr. Butler was strenuously opposed to a power over exports; as 
unjust and alarming to the staple States,” per Madison); id. at 364 (statement of John Rutledge, 
as rendered by Madison) (noting the direct connection between the size of the slave population 
and the volume of exportable commodities). 
 119. See Primus, supra note 2, at 615–18. 
 120. That being the case, one might well ask why South Carolina’s delegates did not pursue 
a blanket prohibition on any national legislation touching slavery, as such—why, that is, they 
focused their demands for prohibition on the proximate matters of the slave trade and export 
taxes, rather than directly on the institution itself.  One reasonable answer is that they had a 
sense of what their fellow delegates would agree to. 
 121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 122. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 605 (July 13, 1787) (statement of 
Pierce Butler, as recorded by Madison); see also MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE 
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).  But see GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A 
SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION:  SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 103–42 (2010) (questioning this account). 
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for the slave trade only until 1808, in part because it was confident that by 
1808 the balance of power in the general government would be such that 
Congress would not ban the slave trade then either.123  And the calculation 
that decisionmaking power within the general government was much more 
important to the future of slavery than anything about the texts describing 
what powers Congress could exercise seems to have been borne out by 
history.  Slavery lasted as long as proslavery politicians maintained control 
of the general government’s elected branches, but it did not last much longer. 
C.  “Sovereignty” 
Another possible reason for wanting to limit Congress was more abstract.  
Under the Constitution, states would not be sovereign in the way they had 
officially been under the Articles of Confederation.124  But if not sovereign 
entities, what exactly would the states be?  Would anything be left of their 
separate autonomy once sovereignty was compromised?  Some delegates 
wondered whether the state governments would become “mere 
corporations”125—something like administrative departments of a national 
government carrying out tasks at their subordinate station.126  Many 
delegates wanted them to be more than that—to have some existence 
 
 123. Whether that was a miscalculation depends on where one ends the story.  Formally, 
Congress did prohibit the slave trade in 1808.  As a matter of practice, the slave trade 
continued, and prominently so through South Carolina, and the general government declined 
to stop it. See generally W. E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE 
TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1638–1870, at 89–93 (New York, Longmans, 
Green & Co. 1896); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Louisiana Purchase and South 
Carolina’s Reopening of the Slave Trade in 1803, 22 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 263 (2002). 
 124. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (“Each state retains its 
Sovereignty . . . .”). 
 125. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of 
James Mason, as rendered by Madison). 
 126. On the origins of American colonies as corporations, and as exercising power under 
the constraints faced by other corporations, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of 
Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 535–55 (2006).  On the idea that states under the new 
Constitution might be conceived as corporations, see id. at 545–46, 546 n.241 (recounting 
articulations of this idea at the Convention and also outside the Convention in 1787).  Note, 
however, that the idea of the states as “corporations” was slippery, and it could also point in 
the opposite direction from the one described in this sentence.  For example, the prominent 
anti-Federalist Robert Yates, who represented New York at the Convention until he left in 
disgust, charged during the ratification debates that the new Constitution would create a 
general government with governmental power of every kind, rather than only a specified 
subset of powers, precisely because the Constitution neglected the states in their “corporate” 
capacity.  Writing pseudonymously as Brutus, Yates wrote that the Constitution “will not be 
a compact entered into by the states, in their corporate capacities, but an agreement of the 
people of the United States, as one great body politic,” from which it followed that the power 
of the government so created would “extend to every case for which any government is 
instituted.” See Brutus XII, supra note 99, at 74.  To distinguish this valence of the idea of 
states as corporations from the one discussed in the main text, it may be useful to remember 
that Convention delegates contemplating the possibility that the states would be just 
administrative departments of the national government often spoke of the states in that 
condition as mere corporations.  The adjective signals something important. See HULSEBOSCH, 
supra note 100, at 223 (describing a continuum of corporate entities, from weak to strong, and 
the question of where along that continuum states would lie). 
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independent of, and decisionmaking autonomy from, the general 
government.127  Whether that additional measure of autonomy could in any 
helpful sense be described in the language of “sovereignty” is a complex 
question.128  (Which is why the heading for this section appears in scare 
quotes.)  But whether or not sovereignty is an analytically illuminating rubric 
for considering the status of states under the Constitution, some delegates 
were concerned that the proposed Constitution would make the states fully 
subordinate to a national government, and they used the language of 
sovereignty (and of “mere corporations”) to express that concern.129  And 
according to a commonly held view, one way to guarantee states a 
meaningful and not fully subordinate existence would be to provide that over 
a broad swath of decisionmaking, state governments would be the sole 
decisionmakers.130 
From the ratification debates forward, the enumeration of congressional 
powers has been presented as a means to that end.  But there are at least two 
important ways in which the idea of the enumeration as a means for giving 
the states a status beyond that of “mere corporations” is more problematic 
than generally recognized.  First, the idea of enumerating congressional 
powers does not seem to have figured in the Convention’s major discussions 
of the status of states.  When the delegates discussed ensuring that the states 
would enjoy some sort of quasi-sovereign status, the proffered solutions 
tended to sound in the structure of the general government rather than in the 
list of projects that that government could pursue.  According to 
Connecticut’s William Samuel Johnson, for example, letting state 
legislatures appoint one branch of Congress could preserve the states as 
something like sovereign entities within the Virginia Plan’s overall scheme 
of a robust national government.131  Within that way of thinking, 
guaranteeing states a status greater than mere administrative arms of the 
national government meant giving states seats at the table, rather than 
limiting what could be decided there. 
Second, there is a mismatch between the goal of guaranteeing something 
like autonomy or quasi-sovereignty for the states and the description of 
congressional powers that the Convention actually drafted.  The sine qua non 
of an enumeration of congressional powers designed to meet the state-status 
concern would be that it be limiting.  That means two things.  First, the 
enumeration of powers must not be one that would in practice allow the 
 
 127. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of 
George Mason, as rendered by Madison). 
 128. For an excellent and thorough argument that sovereignty has ceased to be a useful 
category in political thought, and indeed that it had probably ceased to be so by the time of 
the founding, see generally DON HERZOG, SOVEREIGNTY R.I.P. (2020). 
 129. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of George 
Mason, as rendered by Madison). 
 130. Id. at 25 (July 17, 1787) (statement of Roger Sherman, as rendered by Madison) 
(proposing that Congress should not be able to interfere in matters of “internal police” within 
the states). 
 131. 1 id. at 354–55 (June 21, 1787) (statement of William Samuel Johnson, as rendered 
by Madison); id. at 362–63 (statement of William Samuel Johnson, as rendered by Yates). 
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national government to make law across all, or nearly all, of the important 
policy domains.  Second, it must be unmistakable that Congress could 
legislate only on the basis of the powers enumerated.  That principle—that 
Congress could exercise only a closed set of legislative authorities—would 
be at least as important as any particular substantive choice about what 
powers were and were not allocated to Congress. 
It is not clear that the Constitution the Convention drafted answers to the 
first criterion.  For a long time, the enumerated powers of Congress have, in 
practice, authorized legislation on pretty much any topic.  The conventional 
thinking today is that the founders did not see things that way, but in fact 
many Americans in that generation—including both promoters and 
opponents of the Constitution—read the Preamble,132 the General Welfare 
Clause,133 and the Necessary and Proper Clause134 as plausibly vesting 
Congress with general legislative power, or at least something close to it.135  
To be sure, many of the Constitution’s supporters publicly rejected that 
reading during the ratification debates.  But the fact that that reading existed, 
and that it was prominent rather than merely marginal, makes it problematic 
to conclude that the Constitution clearly did not warrant congressional power 
that broad.  And with respect to the second criterion, it would have been easy 
for the Framers to state clearly, in the Constitution’s text, that Congress could 
legislate only the basis of the powers enumerated.  They did not.136  Given 
the purported importance of the principle, it is a suggestive omission.137 
One might respond that the Framers did not clearly articulate the principle 
that Congress was confined to its enumerated powers because they took that 
principle for granted.  But if so, the Framers must have been puzzlingly 
obtuse.  As soon as the draft Constitution was offered to the public, critics 
 
 132. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 133. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 134. Id. cl. 18. 
 135. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 633 (Sept. 15, 1787) (statement of 
Elbridge Gerry, as rendered by Madison) (declining to sign the Constitution in part because 
of “the general power of the Legislature to make what laws they may please to call necessary 
and proper”); George Mason, Objections to This Constitution of Government (Sept. 15, 1787), 
reprinted in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 637, 640 (Mason’s “Objections to this 
Constitution of Government”) (warning that the Necessary and Proper Clause would permit 
Congress to “extend their powers <power> as far as they shall think proper”); Brutus I, N.Y.J., 
Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 5, at 411, 414 (writing that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause gave Congress general jurisdiction); see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1921 
(1791) (statement of Rep. Elias Boudinot) (treating the Preamble as a broad grant of power); 
id. at 1917–18 (statement of Rep. John Lawrence) (same). 
 136. Some say that the Constitution does indeed say that in the Vesting Clause of Article 
I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  But as I have explained at (somewhat ridiculous) length 
elsewhere, that is a bad reading of the Vesting Clause, and it is virtually certain that nobody 
held that view of the clause at the Convention. See generally Richard Primus, Herein of 
“Herein Granted”:  Why Article I’s Vesting Clause Does Not Support the Doctrine of 
Enumerated Powers, 35 CONST. COMMENT. 301 (2020). 
 137. Given the existence of many readers who described the enumeration as limiting, the 
point is not that the omission of a clear statement of the principle shows that the enumeration 
of powers was not meant to be limiting.  What it indicates, rather, is that the Framers as a 
group were not clearly of the view that the enumeration was meant to be limiting. 
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began to argue that the list of enumerated powers was not limiting, and they 
could make that argument because the document did not make the contrary 
principle clear.138  As Thomas Jefferson put the point in a letter to Madison, 
one could say that the enumerated powers were limiting, but the document 
could just as easily support the opposite inference.139  Perhaps the Framers 
were not such poor readers of their own worked-over text not to anticipate 
that point. 
Similarly, it would be odd for the Framers to have thought that the 
principle that Congress could legislate only based on its enumerated powers 
would be taken for granted if they also thought that limiting Congress to a 
set of enumerated powers would ensure that the states would not be “mere 
corporations.”140  Anyone paying attention at the Convention would know 
that several leading delegates—Alexander Hamilton,141 Wilson,142 
Gouverneur Morris,143 and maybe even Madison144—might want a 
Constitution that would, in practice if not by declaration, reduce the states to 
the status of administrative departments of the national government.145  
Surely the delegates who did not want to reduce the states to that status would 
have recognized the issue as live and contested.  Against that background, it 
would be odd for the Convention to have thought that it could enumerate 
 
 138. See Centinel II, supra note 85, at 460 (noting that the Articles of Confederation 
specified the principle expressly, so it was noteworthy and significant that the Constitution 
did not); Letter from Cincinnatus I to James Wilson (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 13 DHRC, 
supra note 5, at 529, 531. 
 139. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 7, at 482–83 (“[T]o 
say, as mr Wilson does that a bill of rights was not necessary because all is reserved in the 
case of the general government which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given 
which is not reserved, might do for the Audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely a 
gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from 
the omission of the clause of our present confederation which had declared that in express 
terms.”). 
 140. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of 
George Mason, as rendered by Madison). 
 141. See 1 id. at 291 (June 18, 1787) (as rendered by Madison) (proposing a national 
legislature with power “to pass all laws whatsoever”). 
 142. See id. at 172 (June 8, 1787) (as rendered by King). 
 143. See id. at 530 (July 5, 1787) (as rendered by Madison) (“State attachments, and State 
importance have been the bane of this Country.  We cannot annihilate [the states]; but we may 
perhaps take out the teeth of the serpents.”). 
 144. See id. at 463 (June 29, 1787) (statement of James Madison, as rendered by Madison) 
(suggesting that “too much stress was laid on the rank of the States as political societies”); see 
also id. at 363–64 (June 21, 1787) (statement of James Madison, as rendered by Yates) 
(suggesting that it would be acceptable for the national government to swallow up the state 
governments, so long as it were done for the good of the whole).  To be sure, Yates was an 
unfriendly reader of nationalizing projects, and he may (or may not) have given Madison’s 
words a more extreme meaning than Madison intended.  But for present purposes, what 
matters is whether delegates eager to preserve the states as autonomous decisionmakers would 
have seen other delegates as contending for the contrary, regardless of whether that assessment 
was accurate. 
 145. Some delegates also read other delegates as having this agenda, even if it was denied. 
See, e.g., id. at 263 (June 16, 1787) (statement of John Lansing, as rendered by King) 
(comparing the Virginia and New Jersey Plans and saying that the former “[w]ill absorb the 
State sovereignties & leave them mere Corporations, & Electors of the natl. Senate”). 
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powers, and not specify that the enumeration was limiting, and trust that 
everyone would understand it that way. 
D.  Capacity 
Another reason the delegates had for wanting to articulate limits on the 
national government’s legislative jurisdiction is less intuitive to modern 
Americans.  Its root was a fear not of too much governance but of too little. 
The United States in 1787 was an enormous country, with a growing 
population spread out along more than a thousand miles of seaboard and 
hundreds of miles into the interior as well.  It was not realistic, many of the 
Framers reasoned, for a single legislature to provide for all of the diverse 
locations within such an extensive polity.146  The country needed 
governmental action:  commerce had to be fostered and regulated, roads and 
canals had to be built, and so on.  If Congress had the responsibility for all 
the necessary legislation, a great deal would be left undone.  No single 
legislature could have the time and the information necessary for attending 
to all these matters.  Lacking real acquaintance with the needs of all of the 
country’s far-flung localities, Congress would often fail to provide the 
governance that those areas required.147 
A comment at the Convention by Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth 
exemplifies this concern.  As Madison recorded the comment, Ellsworth said 
that “[w]hat he wanted was domestic happiness.  The Nat[iona]l 
Gov[ernmen]t could not descend to the local objects on which this 
depended.”148  The rendering of Ellsworth’s comment in Robert Yates’s 
notes is even more suggestive: 
I want domestic happiness, as well as general security.  A general 
government will never grant me this, as it cannot know my wants or relieve 
my distress.  My state is only as one out of thirteen.  Can they, the general 
government, gratify my wishes?  My happiness depends as much on the 
existence of my state government, as a new-born infant depends upon its 
mother for nourishment.149 
The concern here is not with limiting the power of government, lest too much 
power be a threat to liberty.  The concern is with making sure that 
government is sufficiently active, attentive, and supportive to supply the 
 
 146. See id. at 155 (June 7, 1787) (statement of George Mason, as rendered by Madison) 
(“[W]hatever power may be necessary for the Natl. Govt. a certain portion must necessarily 
be left in the States.  It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U.S. 
so as to carry equal justice to them.”); id. at 287 (June 18, 1787) (statement of Alexander 
Hamilton, as rendered by Madison) (“The extent of the Country to be governed, discouraged 
him.”); id. at 357 (June 21, 1787) (statement of James Madison, as rendered by Madison) 
(“The great objection made ag[ain]st an abolition of the State Govts. was that the Gen[era]l 
Gov[ernmen]t could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the 
cognizance of the local jurisdictions.  The objection as stated lay not ag[ain]st the probable 
abuse of the general power, but ag[ain]st the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout 
so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects.”). 
 147. See, e.g., id. at 357–58 (statement of Madison, as rendered by Madison). 
 148. Id. at 492 (June 30, 1787) (statement of Oliver Ellsworth, as rendered by Madison). 
 149. Id. at 502 (statement of Ellsworth, as rendered by Yates). 
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conditions for a flourishing life.  The language of “nourishment” and the 
analogy to an infant depending on its mother could hardly be more 
powerful150 on this point.  The threat to be addressed is the possibility that 
government will do too little. 
To a modern constitutional lawyer, this concern does not call for limiting 
the powers of Congress.  Modern Americans know that what Congress leaves 
undone can be done by state and local governments.  The modern government 
operates, as a general matter, with a theory of concurrent jurisdiction, 
meaning that in most areas of domestic policy the state legislatures and 
Congress are simultaneously competent to regulate.  Federal regulation 
prevails in case of conflict, but in the absence of federal law, states can act 
as they like.  So if Congress fails to attend to some important economic need 
particular to people in Connecticut, Connecticut can take appropriate 
measures by itself.  But in 1787, many of the Framers either did not grasp or 
else actively were skeptical of concurrent jurisdiction.  According to a 
commonly held view, Congress and the state legislatures needed to regulate 
separate and nonoverlapping policy domains.151  Within that framework, 
assigning domains of legislation to Congress meant preempting state 
legislation in those domains.  And on that understanding, giving Congress 
more responsibility than it could handle was dangerous, because it meant that 
whatever Congress failed to do would simply go undone. 
Modern Americans often neglect this aspect of the Framers’ worldview.  
Working from the premise that the primary role of the Constitution is to limit 
governmental action, many intuitively think that the point of confining 
Congress’s powers to certain domains is to prevent Congress from 
overregulating.  But the Framers were not primarily worried about 
congressional overregulation.  They were more worried about 
underregulation; the government they knew was too weak, not too strong, 
and their project was to enable government to do more, not less.  And they 
needed to be careful, lest their design of a more powerful national 
government inadvertently compound the underregulation problem by 
stripping local officials of the authority they would need to govern all the 
areas of life that Congress, as a practical matter, would not be able to manage.  
To the extent that the Framers envisioned only one government being 
responsible for any given policy domain, they needed to avoid assigning too 
many domains to Congress—not for fear that Congress would regulate too 
much but for fear that Congress would regulate too little and that the states 
would be legally barred from picking up the slack.  Enumerating specific 
 
 150. Or more gendered.  The “Mommy State” has deeper roots than many of its detractors 
recognize. 
 151. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 34–35 (May 30, 1787) (statement 
of Roger Sherman, as rendered by Madison); id. at 53 (May 31, 1787) (statement of Charles 
Pinckney, as rendered by Madison) (reflecting the view that power given to Congress 
necessarily withdraws power from states).  See generally ALISON L. LACROIX, THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010) (emphasizing the importance, in 
American thought up until the time of the Convention, of the idea that different legislatures 
had jurisdiction over different subject matters). 
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domains of congressional legislation might have seemed like a way to 
address this problem. 
If measured by this purpose, the Convention’s choice to enumerate specific 
powers of Congress should be classified as a success.  For more or less the 
Constitution’s first century, the laws whose constitutionality the judiciary 
measured by reference to Article I, Section 8 were usually not federal laws.  
The laws whose constitutionality were at issue on federalism grounds were 
usually state laws, and the question was whether the relevant state had 
legislated in an area of congressional jurisdiction—most commonly under 
the Commerce Clause152—and therefore, on the separate-spheres model, an 
area in which state law was preempted even if congressional power lay 
dormant.153  By construing the Commerce Clause narrowly, nineteenth-
century courts preserved the ability of state governments to regulate the 
social world at a time when Congress lacked the will and the resources to do 
so in any comprehensive way. 
But note some dynamic features of the enumeration, understood this way.  
First, this approach to Congress’s enumerated powers would make it logical 
for courts to give congressional legislation a strong presumption of 
constitutionality.  The problem to be solved, after all, is not that Congress 
might regulate things it should not.  It is that Congress might fail to regulate 
in areas where it is the only authorized regulator.  So where Congress has in 
fact regulated, thus obviating the risk that nobody will regulate, the courts 
can sustain Congress’s regulation—provided only that the judges can 
articulate a construction of congressional power on which what Congress has 
done is different from most of what the states are doing, thus avoiding the 
conclusion that a lot of state regulation comes within one of Congress’s 
domains and is therefore invalid.  (Such constructions might include, “This 
federal law is a regulation of commerce among the states, so it is unlike, and 
does not preempt, state laws that merely exercise the police power.”  Or, 
“This federal law regulates commerce directly, so it is unlike, and does not 
preempt, state laws that regulate commerce but only indirectly.”) 
So consider what might happen over time if Americans became more 
interested in having an active national legislature and congressional capacity 
 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 153. See, e.g., Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); 
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); Smith 
v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 408–10 (1849) (plurality opinion); 
Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 582–83 (1847), overruled 
in part by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 
Pet.) 102, 143 (1837); Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251–52 
(1829); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445–49 (1827); see also Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (“For nearly a century . . . decisions of this Court under the 
Commerce Clause dealt rarely with questions of what Congress might do in the exercise of its 
granted power under the Clause, and almost entirely with the permissibility of state activity 
which it was claimed discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce.  During this 
period there was perhaps little occasion for the affirmative exercise of the commerce power, 
and the influence of the Clause on American life and law was a negative one, resulting almost 
wholly from its operation as a restraint upon the powers of the states.”). 
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increased.  As Congress gradually pushed its legislation into more and more 
areas, judicial willingness to sustain the things that Congress did would yield 
a significantly expanded sense of what Congress’s enumerated powers 
include.  As judicial legitimations of federal laws multiplied, it would 
become harder and harder to articulate plausible categorical distinctions 
between the purported sphere of Congress and that of the states, thus putting 
pressure on the idea that Congress and the states occupy separate regulatory 
spheres.  That pressure could be relieved by adjusting to the idea of 
concurrent jurisdiction:  why exactly, we now say, can Congress and the 
states not regulate in the same domains?  And once we adjust to the idea of 
concurrent jurisdiction, preserving the states’ capacity to regulate where 
needed would no longer require courts to articulate Congress’s legislative 
jurisdiction as if it occupied only specific slices of the social world.  All of 
which is pretty much what happened.154 
All told, it is possible to see the Convention’s enumeration of 
congressional powers as an attempt—indeed, a sensible attempt—to address 
the problem of potential underregulation, in a world where Congress would 
have limited capacity and concurrent jurisdiction was not yet well accepted.  
And to the extent that this way of thinking captures the point of enumerating 
Congress’s powers, the enumeration was a solution to a problem that 
American law no longer has.  No wonder it does not do much work. 
CONCLUSION 
Few constitutional theorists, whether originalists or otherwise, contend 
that the intentions of the Framers determine the correct answers to modern 
questions of constitutional law.  But the correct answers to questions of 
constitutional history often depend on the ideas of the Framers, because the 
content of the Framers’ ideas is precisely what some of those questions are 
about.  Our interest in understanding the Convention is not exhausted by our 
interest in modern law. 
Moreover, it would misunderstand American constitutional culture to 
think that decisions about modern constitutional law are entirely independent 
of modern decisionmakers’ intuitions about the ideas of the Framers, even 
when those decisionmakers do not consciously believe that the Framers’ 
intentions are a source of constitutional authority.  It is hard, and rare, for 
modern decisionmakers to think, “Here is the right answer, and it flies in the 
face of the judgment of the Philadelphia Convention.”155  In other words, 
intuitions about the story of the Convention frame many modern 
constitutional analyses, even absent a claim that anything about the 
Convention is authoritative.  Nomos and narrative maintain some rough 
correspondence.  So until we accept a better understanding of the 
 
 154. For one good telling of this story, see Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:  
United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125. 
 155. Cf. Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44 
(2016) (describing this feature of the psychology of constitutional decisionmaking). 
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Convention, the present one, with its flaws, will do work in constitutional 
law. 
